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EdWorkingPaper No. 20-189

Shifting Alliances in State Political Parties: The Case of Education Interest Groups

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Political parties in the U.S. are composed of networks of interest groups, according to the extended party network theory. Scholars have focused on national extended party networks. We use the case of education interest groups to explore how policy environments shape party networks on the state level. Using 145,000 campaign contributions from 2000 to 2017, we show that the alignment of education interest groups has changed over time. In 2000, teachers unions were the dominant group and aligned with Democrats. Meanwhile, Republicans lacked support from any education group. This pattern was relatively consistent across states. Over time, coalitions diverged, with some state networks polarizing, meaning unions increasingly aligned with Democrats and reform groups with Republicans, while others did not experience such polarization. We find that labor law restrictions and private school choice programs were related to these trends, suggesting that state-level policies shape the contours of state party networks.

VERSION: January 2020

Suggested citation: Finger, Leslie K., and Sarah Reckhow. (2020). Shifting Alliances in State Political Parties: The Case of Education Interest Groups. (EdWorkingPaper: 20-189). Retrieved from Annenberg Institute at Brown University: https://www.edworkingpapers.com/ai20-189

Shifting Alliances in State Political Parties: The Case of Education Interest Groups

Leslie K. Finger and Sarah Reckhow

January 2, 2020

Abstract

Political parties in the U.S. are composed of networks of interest groups, according to the extended party network theory. Scholars have focused on national extended party networks. We use the case of education interest groups to explore how policy environments shape party networks on the state level. Using 145,000 campaign contributions from 2000 to 2017, we show that the alignment of education interest groups has changed over time. In 2000, teachers unions were the dominant group and aligned with Democrats. Meanwhile, Republicans lacked support from any education group. This pattern was relatively consistent across states. Over time, coalitions diverged, with some state networks polarizing, meaning unions increasingly aligned with Democrats and reform groups with Republicans, while others did not experience such polarization. We find that labor law restrictions and private school choice programs were related to these trends, suggesting that state-level policies shape the contours of state party networks.

The composition, strategy, and issue positions of political parties in the United States are strongly shaped by the alignment of interest groups. New research on political parties emphasizes the role of interest groups in campaigns, electoral outcomes, and information exchange, advancing the concept of political parties as networks of groups (Desmarais et al. 2015, Grossmann & Dominguez 2009, Koger et al. 2010, Reuning forthcoming). Theoretically, these studies contribute to a perspective known as the Extended Party Network theory of political parties, in which parties are primarily responsive to interest groups, rather than voters (Bawn et al. 2012). As networks of groups, political parties are structured by interest group competition and intense group-level demand for policies (Bawn et al. 2012). A somewhat different take on the relationship between interest groups and parties appears in the account of party asymmetry in Grossmann & Hopkins (2016). Their argument traces systematic differences between the Democratic and Republican parties across several observable characteristics, including interest group alignments, which structure the Democratic and Republican coalitions in very different ways. Democrats, according to Grossmann and Hopkins, are primarily a group-based party; as a result, a large number of widely varied interest groups are aligned with the Democrats. In contrast, the more ideologically-oriented Republican coalition features a smaller number of organized groups.

This body of research mostly focuses on national level politics, which offers only one major context for observing the group coalition of each political party. State-level analysis, however, provides 50 observations with distinct partisan and policy contexts. For example, state politics has traditionally featured varied partisan constituencies (i.e. Democrats in West Virginia are not quite the same as Democrats in California), even if the growing nationalization of party issue positions through media coverage and national fundraising networks are starting to flatten out this kind of variation in state party coalitions (McCarty & Schickler 2018). Indeed, Reuning (forthcoming) shows that state politics offers fertile ground for understanding the factors that could shape interest group network structures and the interactions between parties and interest groups at the state level. In this paper, we

explore whether varying policy contexts across states impact the nature of extended party networks. If interest groups are intense policy demanders that seek to back politicians that will advance their agendas (Bawn et al. 2012), and their agendas are partly determined by the state's policy context, then we would expect differences in state policies to shape extended party networks. In other words, we might anticipate that policy feedback could come into play in influencing party coalitions across states (Mettler & SoRelle 2014).

We examine the relationship between state policies and extended party networks using the case of education. This policy area lends itself well to the study of extended party networks across states because it involves the same or very similar interest groups across state lines, allowing us to track how groups with similar goals and structures align themselves with political parties across different partisan and institutional contexts. Virtually all states have state and local teachers' unions and most have education reform advocates trying to influence state policy. Moreover, it is logical that the politics of education might vary across states, since education in the United States is primarily the responsibility of state governments, whose policies govern what happens in local school districts. States play a much larger role than the federal government in the provision of school funds, and they are the chief policymaking entity for issues like collective bargaining for teachers and the existence and regulation of school choice programs such as vouchers and charter schools, as well as most other education issues. In this way, education is a good case for how state policy variation shapes party coalitions in policy areas where states have a large role in governance. With wide variation in education policy, we can examine the extent to which education policies encourage education interest groups to align themselves more with one party or another.

The specific outcomes that we explore are the involvement of education interest groups in extended party networks as well as the degree to which they diverge in the parties they support within a state, which we call "coalition polarization." We analyze both outcomes–the degree of support for any party and polarization across parties–using state political campaign donations from 2000 to 2017. Our dataset includes every contribution to candidates for

state office and state political party committees, totaling over 145,000 contributions and over 57,000 elections. By leveraging variation in the political and policy contexts of the 50 states over nearly two decades, we examine how the interest group coalitions of the two political parties evolve in response to changes in the policy environment.

Our findings show that the alignment of education interest groups with candidates from each political party was remarkably similar across the 50 states in 2000, fitting an old and well-known story: teachers unions were the dominant education interest group and they were closely aligned with the Democratic Party. Meanwhile, Republicans had little support from any education groups. Yet during the next two decades, the states diverged from one another in remarkable ways–a finding that appears contrary to studies showing increasing national homogeneity in party politics.

We find that that policy feedback, specifically the existence of teacher agency fee bans[1] (or what we refer to as "right to work for teachers") and the presence of private school choice programs, are related to the nature of extended party networks across states as they pertain to education interest groups. The two policies are associated with different levels of participation in extended party networks: where there are right to work laws, the number of candidates receiving donations from teachers' unions is higher, while it the number of candidates supported by reform groups is lower. For private school choice, the relationship is the inverse; choice is associated with a higher probability of a donation from a reform group but a lower probability of a donation from a teachers' union. The two policies are also related to where in extended party networks education interest groups fall: both policies coincide with increased coalition polarization, with teachers' unions focusing on Democrats and reform groups focusing on Republicans. Our findings suggest that policy feedback is a

[1]These are policies that prohibit teachers' unions from automatically deducting funds from non-members in order to pay for the expenses of negotiating labor contracts that apply to all employees. Such prohibitions are sometimes contained within right to work laws that apply to the entire public sector in the state, but they are sometimes enacted for teachers only.

key ingredient for understanding the dynamics and composition of extended party networks in state politics.

Education Interest Groups and Party Alignment

In the book *Special Interest*, Terry Moe aptly summarizes the long-standing conventional wisdom and findings from numerous studies on education interest groups and political parties in state politics: "the bottom line is simple, the teachers unions overwhelmingly support Democratic candidates and they are key supporters of the Democratic Party organization" (2011, 287). Not only does Moe show the consistent alignment of unions with the Democratic Party, he also presents evidence of the dominance of teachers unions as one of the largest contributors overall to candidates for state office and state political parties.

However, there are some reasons to believe that union-party relationships may have changed in recent years, as Democrats have divided on education policy. Cleavages within the party first formed in the 1990s, as civil rights organizations–longtime Democratic supporters–advocated standards, testing, and some types of school choice (Rhodes 2011), which were policies that teachers' unions opposed (Moe 2011, Peterson et al. 2014). In the first decade of the 2000s, the Democratic party converged with Republicans in some policy areas, particularly school and teacher accountability and standards (Hartney & Wolbrecht 2014), while they have come close to convergence on school choice (DeBray-Pelot et al. 2007, Hartney & Wolbrecht 2014). Cleavages within the Democratic party were perhaps most visible during the Obama Administration, when Democrats explicitly supported several policies that teachers' unions usually oppose (Moe 2011, Peterson et al. 2014) like charter schools, performance pay for teachers, teacher evaluations based partly on student test scores, and changes to teacher tenure laws. Despite these shifts, as of 2003, state school choice policy was still more aligned with teachers' unions when union stances and public opinion diverged (Lax & Phillips 2012). Still, the relationship between teachers' unions and Democrats has not been

one of complete support, particularly in recent years.[2]

Additionally, teachers' unions are no longer the only interest group that matters in education politics. New state and national level organizations, which we refer to as "education reform groups," have spread across the states, advocating for the kinds of school choice and accountability-oriented policies that have split the Democratic party on education. Such groups have spread with the help of philanthropic money and the energy of Teach For America alumni (Finger & Lastra-Anadon 2019, Higgins et al. 2011, Manna & Moffitt 2014). These new organizations are often at odds with teachers' unions but not necessarily with Democrats. In some cases, these groups have had a distinct Democratic leaning, like the organization Democrats for Education Reform (DFER), while in other cases, they have been closer to Republicans, as is true with the American Federation for Children, a school

[2]There is also historical precedent to suggest that the picture is more complicated than Moe suggests. The political mobilization of teachers and the political importance of teachers' unions developed in the latter half of the 20th century (Flavin & Hartney 2015, Paglayan 2019). The adoption of mandatory collective bargaining laws for public employees provided a policy subsidy for teacher participation in politics, by reducing the costs to unions for mobilizing teachers (Flavin & Hartney 2015) and enabling national union federations to transfer funds from stronger to weaker affiliates (Finger & Hartney 2019). In light of the strong alignment between teachers unions and Democrats that Moe demonstrates, it might seem obvious that Democratic politicians would have led the charge for mandatory collective bargaining policies in states. Yet that was not the case; instead, the party in power in states that adopted mandatory collective bargaining varied widely, including four states that had unified Republican government (Paglayan 2019: 24). In fact, these policies were often the product of political compromise. As Paglayan (2019) shows, collective bargaining policies were not uniformly pro-labor, instead, many state policies included key provisions to restrict the power of public sector labor unions by limiting strikes through deterrent mechanisms. Overall, both Flavin & Hartney (2015) and Paglayan (2019) demonstrate that policy feedback impacted the nature of teacher union power and organizing in state politics. Unsurprisingly, then, there has been variation in the power and influence that teachers' unions have been able to exercise across states (Finger 2018, Hartney & Flavin 2011). Drawing from this work and knowing that policies concerning education, unions, and teachers in states have continued to evolve, we should not assume that the political consequences of state policy on teacher unions have remained static since the adoption of mandatory collective bargaining.

choice advocacy organization that was run by Betsy DeVos, a prominent Republican donor (and now President Trump's Secretary of Education). Some reform groups have organized teachers, sometimes appearing as counterparts to the teachers' unions (e.g., the organization Educators 4 Excellence). Put simply, an increasing number of education reform groups have formed new party-interest group alliances around education in recent years, and they can be prolific contributors in electoral campaigns (Henig et al. 2019). Teachers' unions can no longer take their dominance for granted in state education politics.

With some Democrats embracing education reform and education reform groups establishing themselves across the country, education reform policies have become law in many states. Since the 1990s, states have adopted a wide array of school choice policies, like charter schools as well as vouchers or other mechanisms to provide public funding to attend private school. States have also adopted various forms of accountability, from academic standards to standardized tests to teacher evaluation systems that reward teachers for student performance (Marianno 2019, Mintrom & Vergari 1998). As mentioned, these are policies that teachers' unions largely oppose (Moe 2011, Peterson et al. 2014). According to Moe (2011), this is because such policies threaten teachers' union power by taking away or changing the provision of resources that would benefit rank-and-file teachers or by getting rid of public school teaching jobs, especially in the case of charter schools and private school choice, meaning less union manpower relative to other interest groups.

The final factor that raises doubts on the conventional wisdom that teachers' unions dominate state education politics with their Democratic allies is the triumph of Republicans in many state legislative elections, and the passage of labor law rollbacks. Since 2010, Republicans have increased their control of state governments. Republican control of state legislatures peaked in 2017, with 32 state legislatures fully controlled by Republicans and 14 controlled by Democrats. These takeovers were predated and aided in policymaking by the spread of conservative state-level think tanks and advocacy groups, which, among other things, promoted policies to limit the influence of public sector unions (Hertel-Fernandez

2016, 2018, 2019, Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez 2016). Following the Republican gains in many state legislatures in 2010, policies to limit public sector collective bargaining and union power began to spread (Hertel-Fernandez 2018, Freeman & Han 2012). For example, Michigan–a state with a long history of strong labor unions–gained national attention for the adoption of right to work legislation in 2012. Some supporters of right to work in Michigan were very explicit that they hoped to use the policy to weaken the powerful state teachers union, the Michigan Education Association (MEA) (Kaminski 2015). According to Hertel-Fernandez (2018), reducing union power is the intent of policies like this, since conservative supporters sought to use policy as a "political weapon" to harm the influence of their Democratic-leaning opponents. Changes to labor law are widely thought to politically handicap unions.

Overall, while unions have a long-standing relationship with Democrats, parties' changing policy priorities as well as the policies they enact may impact the partisan positioning of the broader constellation of education interest groups (including unions) across space and time. Which parties receive support from teachers' unions and reform groups is likely more complicated, meriting further exploration. Fortunately, we are able to directly see this support in the form of campaign contributions, a descriptive task to which we now turn.

State Interest Group Networks

Before we can explore the factors associated with changes to extended party networks, we need to show that they have, in fact, changed. To do so, we created social networks of campaign contributions from three states: Michigan, Tennessee, and Washington. These states provide snapshots of the changes that have emerged in the alignment of education interest groups with Democratic and Republican extended party networks. Each of the three states offers a different context for party control of the legislature and policy changes involving school choice and collective bargaining. Michigan started the 2000s with unified

Republican legislative control, interrupted by a brief period of Democratic control of the House from 2007 to 2010. Tennessee had Democratic control of the legislature until the 2010 election when the state flipped to Republicans. Finally, Democrats have largely maintained power in the Washington state legislature.[3] Education reform and collective bargaining policy changes, factors that we predict should be related to differing extended party networks, are also quite distinct in these states.[4]

Networks of campaign contributions from 2000 and 2016 offer snapshots of the evolution of extended party networks in each state (Figs. 1, 2, and 3). The contributing organizations (unions and education reform groups) are represented with white circles (nodes); unions are labeled "U" and have a black circle outline, and reform organizations are labeled "R" and have a gray outline. The arrows show a contribution relationship to a candidate or party committee that received funds from that organization in that election year. The recipient candidates and committees are represented with black nodes (Democrats) and gray nodes (Republicans).

The networks show both similarities and differences in the evolution of party networks across these states. In 2000, unions were the dominant education interest group making contributions in each state, and while unions mostly funded Democrats, some unions in each state had a more bipartisan giving profile. By 2016, each state has a somewhat different alignment of parties and interest groups. Michigan had the greatest shift toward coalition polarization in the state's extended party networks, as unions in Michigan became more firmly

[3]That said, Republicans gained a majority in the state senate from 2013 to 2017.

[4]Michigan was an early adopter of charter school policy in 1993, though the state does not allow private school vouchers. Additionally, Michigan passed right to work legislation in 2012. Tennessee has been at the forefront of various education reform efforts, recently adopting a new voucher policy. In 2011, Tennessee repealed mandatory collective bargaining for teachers. Washington has had recent political struggles over charter schools, which were approved by a statewide ballot initiative in 2012 but overturned by the state supreme court in 2015. There have been no major changes in collective bargaining policy in Washington state.

aligned with the Democratic party compared to the other states. In both Michigan and Tennessee, reform organizations are mostly aligned with Republicans. The teachers union in Tennessee, TEA, supports many candidates from each party. Finally, unions in Washington mostly support Democrats, and the reform organizations maintain fairly bipartisan contribution patterns, though there is variation among the groups.

Figure 1: Michigan Contribution Networks



(a) 2000



(b) 2016

Figure 2: Tennessee Contribution Networks



(a) 2000



(b) 2016

Figure 3: Washington Contribution Networks



(a) 2000



(b) 2016

These networks shed some light on the extent of change over time and state variation in party networks of education interest groups in the aggregate. How do these changes look if we zoom in to examine the specific candidates in each state? Maintaining our focus on the three states represented in the networks, two of these states (Tennessee and Washington) allow us to explore changes in union and reform organizational funding for legislators with longer career trajectories, because these states do not have term limits for the state legislature. We view these legislators as "anchors" – representing a constant in changing state political environment. Do some of our anchors exhibit changes in their organizational funding support over time? In Tennessee, six Republicans in the legislature and three Democrats (all of the Democrats are African American legislators representing districts in the Memphis area) began their legislative careers solely with TEA funding, but started to receive reform organization money during the 2012 election cycle. By 2016, all but one had been funded by reform organizations only and received no funding from TEA. At the same time, of the 26 Democrats that won their elections to the Tennessee state legislature in 2016, nine had been receiving contributions from teachers' unions for six or more years. Only two of the 58 Republicans winning that year had been receiving teachers' union contributions for that long. Thus, even when the same Tennessee legislators continued to run for office, their funding changed over time in ways that suggest growing alignment between reform organizations and Republicans– with the notable exception of the three African American Democrats representing Memphis who also experienced this shift. Recently-retired Tennessee Representative Harry Brooks, a Republican from Knoxville, provides a useful illustration. Brooks–a former teacher, counselor, and school board member– was first elected to the Tennessee legislature in 2002. The TEA was among his top five donors in that election cycle, and TEA supported each of his re-election campaigns through 2010. Yet in 2012, TEA did not fund Brooks, though he did receive campaign funds from an education reform organization, StudentsFirst. His donors in 2014 included StudentsFirst and TEA, but in 2016, TEA again did not support Brooks while StudentsFirst continued to provide campaign funds.

The view from Washington state looks somewhat different from Tennessee, with 12 anchor candidates shifting from solely union funding to solely reform organization funding, but the majority (8) are Democrats. Thus, Washington does not display as much partisan sorting of anchor candidates that emerges in Tennessee. Instead, there are more Democrats in Washington who appear to be making a shift from union support to reform organization support, reflecting the more bipartisan contribution patterns of reform groups in Washington.

Overall, the divergent trajectories of these states offers evidence for multiple possible explanations for changes in the partisan alignment of education groups, since each of the three states has experienced some changes in the political composition of the state legislature as well as changes in education and/or labor union policies. Below, we develop our theoretical explanation for the relationship between policy changes and the composition of extended party networks.

Policy Feedback and Extended Party Networks

What factors are likely to shape the composition and alignment of education interest group coalitions for each political party at the state level? Based on policy feedback theory, wherein the passage of policies shapes the political behavior of actors as well as subsequent policy-making (Pierson 1993), we would expect interest groups of different types to encounter changing levels of resources and political opportunities following state policy changes. We hypothesize that two types of recent policy changes should be related to our two outcomes of interest, which are education interest group involvement in coalitions and coalition polarization. First, policies impacting public sector unions (such as right to work laws), which have been a favorite of Republican-controlled legislatures in recent years, could impact the ways that teacher unions get involved in state politics. For example, Hertel-Fernandez (2018) explains that labor rollbacks could be described as policy feedback as a "political weapon," given that they are usually meant to politically weaken public sector unions. Yet these efforts

to chip away at union resources may not translate directly into reducing unions' political spending. In fact, such policies, especially when backed by conservative Republicans, might lead teachers' unions to *increase* their involvement in party coalitions in the immediate years following bill passage as a defensive measure in response to a policy defeat. Research by Marianno & Strunk (2018) on union contributions following adoption of right to work policies in two states suggests unions can become more politically active immediately following retrenchment. *Therefore, we expect the passage of right to work laws to increase teachers' union contributions without impacting reformers.*

The second type of policy change that can impact political education interest groups' alliances is the passage of education reform policies, meaning accountability, standards, and school choice. School choice policies are particularly likely to create new constituencies, including groups involved in school management and parents of children who attend choice schools (Greene 2015). These groups will have a stake in defending or expanding state education reform policies. Such policies may also attract groups with less material and personal stake but that are ideological education reform advocates; philanthropists or branches of existing education reform federations may set up state-level groups to pursue additional policy expansion. If school choice policies spur the establishment of new constituencies, such as families that receive vouchers for their children to attend private school, they would likely increase reform groups' involvement in extended party networks. For teachers' unions, on the other hand, school choice policies should weaken public school teachers as a political force as jobs shift to private schools (Moe 2011), although this effect would be minimized where choice policies are limited in scope. *Therefore, we expect private school choice to decrease teachers' unions' share of contributions while increasing contributions from reform groups.*

If policy feedback suggests that unions in some states will have declining political resources and new education interest groups will gain opportunities, how will these groups align with the two major political parties? In other words, how will these policies shape our second outcome–coalition polarization? For labor retrenchment, we expect that teachers

unions' historical alignment with the Democratic Party, which does not support such policies, may become even stronger as legislatures adopt labor retrenchment policies, such as right to work. This would be a defensive shift intended to punish Republicans, who tend to support labor retrenchment policies. This increased focus on Democrats would lead to the polarization of extended party networks, even if retrenchment doesn't impact reform groups' alliances, since teachers' unions would be shifting away from Republicans they may have previously supported.

For private school choice, however, we anticipate that polarization would be driven by the behavior of reform groups. Since Republicans are often associated with private school choice policies, we anticipate that where such policies are in place, education reform groups will focus on their policy allies: Republicans. This would generate coalition polarization, even if such policies don't change teachers' unions alliances. In sum, *we expect both private school choice and right to work to increase coalition polarization.*

It is worth noting that, while we focus on school choice, other education reform policies might result in different alliances for interest group organizations supporting education reform. Overall, we expect education reform organizations to be more active in state political coalitions in response to policy feedback, specifically the adoption of education reform policies. However, many education reforms have had bipartisan support in recent years (Hartney & Wolbrecht 2014). For policies such as increasing school accountability, there is not a clear partisan outcome for policy feedback, since education reformers might see both Democrats and Republicans as champions of this policy. Thus, we focus on an education reform that has a stronger partisan alignment: private school choice policies, which are primarily supported by the Republican Party (Hackett & King 2019). Vouchers, tax credits, and other forms of private school choice have direct beneficiaries (families that use private school vouchers). For these constituencies, Republicans are the champions of private school choice. We expect that education reform advocates will have constituency based and ideological alignment with the Republican party in states with voucher policies in place.

Data

In order to explore the involvement and alignment of education interest groups with political parties across states, we use campaign contribution data from the National Institute on Money in Politics (followthemoney.org). As campaign contribution data have become easily accessible through online sources, such data are increasingly being used to map party networks (Grossmann & Dominguez 2009, Reuning forthcoming). Campaign contribution data provides detailed information on the timing and amount of funds provided by organizations to candidates for state office as well as state party organizations (which in turn, support candidates). Unions largely rely on dues that come from their membership to provide resources for funding political campaigns, though they also rely on separate PAC donations from members, while education reform organizations often lack dues paying members, so their funding comes from other sources. Donations to these organizations are sometimes not visible, particularly for those with 501(c)(4) status, but prior research indicates that wealthy education philanthropists such as Eli Broad, Reed Hastings, Michael Bloomberg, and Laurene Powell Jobs are key contributors to education reform organizations that are involved in politics (Henig et al. 2019).

The campaign contribution data displays each donation from an organization to a campaign or committee, including information about the partisan affiliation of the recipient. With this data, we can track the evolution of party networks across states from 2000 to 2017, with particular attention to the different trajectories of education interest groups. We use this data to carry out analyses at the state-, race-, and candidate-level in order to explore the role of policies and state partisan control in the evolution of cross-state partisan networks.

We analyze several dependent variables. First, we look at variables that capture education interest groups' involvement in extended party networks. The first way we do this is by looking at states over time and comparing the normalized out-degree centrality of the largest teachers' union and reform group contributors in each state. The centrality variable captures

an interest group's relative dominance in party coalitions. This analysis allows us to see how the importance of each type of interest group to the overall partisan coalition is changing over time.

The second group of dependent variables capture the degree to which education interest groups overlap or are polarized in their partisan alignments. We examine polarization in party coalitions at the state-level as well as at the election-level. At the state level, we examine the degree of overlap in the percentage of Republican candidates supported. At the election-level, we look at individual races and test whether our hypothesized policy variables are related to teachers' unions and reformers supporting candidates from opposing major parties in a given race.

Our third group of dependent variables dig deeper into the mechanism displayed in the first two analyses. Specifically, we use data at the candidate level to examine whether candidates received a campaign contribution from a teachers' union or reform group and whether the effect of our hypothesized policy variables varies by the partisanship of the candidate. Specifically, we are interested in whether education interest groups were more likely to donate to Democratic candidates in states with our hypothesized policy variables.

Our key explanatory variables are whether the state has any type of private school choice[5] and whether the state prohibits agency fees for teachers. As to the former, the private school choice variable captures the existence of any type of public funding to attend private school, including vouchers, tax credits, tax deductions, education savings accounts etc. This information comes from the Friedman Foundation's "ABCs of School Choice" reports. The second explanatory variable indicates whether the state prohibits the automatic deduction of fees from non-teachers' union members. We refer to this as having a "right to work" law, although it is important to note that sometimes teachers' union agency fees are prohibited within larger right to work laws, and sometimes states prohibit such fees outside of

[5]Our results are robust to including a measure of the number of private school choice programs rather than a binary variable for having any program.

encompassing right to work laws.

In analyzing contribution trends and alliances over time, we account for several confounders that we expect would impact both the electoral involvement of education interest groups as well as our policy independent variables: we control for both Republican legislative control as well as conservative political ideology[6] because both education groups' electoral behavior and the passage of private school choice and right to work laws should be shaped by the state legislature's political ideology. We control for the strength of teachers' unions because where teachers unions have more members, they will have more funds and capacity to donate to campaigns, and this may also impact policy outcomes (Moe 2011). We use National Education Association (NEA) membership rates from NEA documents that were shared with us by Michael Hartney.[7] We also control for whether there was a school choice advocacy group present in the state since such groups may similarly shape the passage of policies and the election of partisan candidates, as well as the electoral involvement of education interest groups. The existence of choice groups already on the ground may make additional advocacy groups looking to donate to campaigns particularly inclined to get involved.[8] Data on education reform advocacy groups were hand collected by the authors using a variety of sources. We also include an indicator for whether the state has term limits for state legislators, coding as "1" the first year such laws went into effect. Term limits could be related to increasing polarization in the legislature and may also be related to differences in policy outcomes (Masket & Schor 2015, Cain & Kousser 2004). Finally, we include a linear time trend to account for the fact that reform groups have increasingly cropped up

[6]For political ideology, we use the NOMINATE measure of state political ideology created by Berry et al. (2010).

[7]In some cases the data originated with Mike Antonucci. Results are similar if we instead use public sector membership rates to compensate for the fact that the NEA numbers leave out the American Federation of Teachers (AFT).

[8]Note, though, that sometimes, but not always, groups within the states are the same groups donating to elections.

over time, as well as any other factors associated with the passage of time. All controls are lagged one year.[9] We also include state fixed effects in all the state-level models to account for fixed state factors that may confound our analysis.

The Changing Involvement of Education Groups in State Elections

Descriptively, it is clear that partisan-education interest group alliances have changed. Table 1 aggregates contribution data from 2000 to 2003 and from 2014 to 2017 to show how the breakdown of education interest group contributions has shifted. The first column in each time period lists the percent of all education interest group donations that came from teachers' unions. At the start of the 2000s, the vast majority of dollars came from teachers' unions; only eight states had any reform group involvement at all, and even for those states, the vast majority of funds from education interest groups came from teachers' unions. By 2014 to 2017, however, there was a notable shift, with reform groups contributing to state-level campaigns in 34 states. In three states - California, Georgia and Tennessee - reform groups contributed almost the same amount as teachers' unions.[10]

Which parties benefited from these contributions? For teachers' unions, Democrats received the vast majority of funds in both periods. That said, there is variation, with unions

[9]Where the dependent variable includes data from two years, as in the state-level analyses of centrality and polarization, our controls are lagged prior to the dependent variable. For example, if the dependent variable includes centrality information from year t and t-1, the controls are lagged to t-2.

[10]Note that this table does not include independent expenditures, although we provide this information in Table A1 in the appendix. We do not include independent expenditures in our main analyses because the National Institute on Money in Politics only has such information starting in 2006, and, due to different disclosure laws across states, we can access only some states' data. Moreover, even among those states disclosing independent expenditures, there are differences in what spending must be reported. Nevertheless, the patterns displayed in Table A1 are quite similar to those displayed in Table 1.

increasing their support for Democrats dramatically in some states (Wisconsin, Washington, Virginia, Ohio, New Jersey, Kentucky, Idaho) while others bucked the general trend and began giving the majority of their funds to Republicans (Utah, Tennessee, Mississippi, Georgia). The rest remained relatively stable. On the side of reform groups, there is little to compare to since reformers were hardly present in electoral politics at the start of the 2000s.

Table 1: Change in the Origin of Education Interest Group Contributions and Their Partisan Destinations

	2000-2003				2014-2017			
	% Ed Group $ from TU	TU % of Amt to Dems	% Ed Group $ from Ref. Groups	Reform Groups % of Amt to Repubs	% Ed Group $ from TU	TU % of Amt to Dems	% Ed Group $ From Ref. Groups	Reform Groups % of Amt to Repubs
Alabama	100	68	0	0	97	78	3	96
Alaska	100	91	0	0	100	73	0	0
Arizona	100	38	0	0	99	98	1	0
Arkansas	100	90	0	0	98	92	2	34
California	88	84	12	1	52	98	48	2
Colorado	100	94	0	100	60	93	40	11
Connecticut	100	89	0	0	53	87	47	0
Delaware	100	56	0	0	100	91	0	0
Florida	99	89	1	100	93	94	7	95
Georgia	98	68	2	100	47	65	53	73
Hawaii	100	76	0	0	97	95	3	15
Idaho	100	72	0	0	100	97	0	0
Illinois	100	76	0	0	71	73	29	26
Indiana	100	90	0	0	94	98	6	48
Iowa	100	96	0	0	100	100	0	0
Kansas	100	86	0	0	100	80	0	0
Kentucky	100	77	0	0	100	90	0	0
Louisiana	100	88	0	0	58	47	42	66
Maine	100	99	0	0	100	99	0	100
Maryland	100	99	0	0	97	98	3	0
Massachusetts	100	100	0	0	97	99	3	0
Michigan	88	57	12	100	90	95	10	60
Minnesota	100	86	0	0	100	82	0	0
Mississippi	100	44	0	0	71	32	29	1
Missouri	82	87	18	20	86	95	14	76
Montana	100	83	0	0	100	100	0	0
Nebraska	100	0	0	0	94	39	6	0
Nevada	100	89	0	0	75	90	25	25
New Hampshire	100	96	0	0	99	100	1	100
New Jersey	99	57	1	0	81	77	19	64
New Mexico	100	98	0	0	100	99	0	0
New York	56	83	44	11	59	93	41	3
North Carolina	100	96	0	0	88	85	12	91
North Dakota	100	70	0	0	100	100	0	0
Ohio	100	46	0	0	94	62	6	88
Oklahoma	100	87	0	0	87	69	13	52
Oregon	100	93	0	100	73	98	27	6
Pennsylvania	100	86	0	0	98	92	2	25
Rhode Island	87	97	13	0	100	97	0	0
South Carolina	100	90	0	0	57	85	43	32
South Dakota	100	91	0	0	100	73	0	0
Tennessee	100	84	0	100	46	29	54	89
Texas	100	84	0	0	92	71	8	55
Utah	100	82	0	0	84	20	16	8
Vermont	100	100	0	0	100	86	0	0
Virginia	100	70	0	0	97	94	3	100
Washington	94	80	6	67	51	97	49	3
West Virginia	100	95	0	0	100	96	0	0
Wisconsin	100	62	0	0	98	89	2	97
Wyoming	100	78	0	0	100	58	0	0

By 2014 to 2017, however, reform groups varied dramatically in the degree to which they supported the two parties. Of the 34 states where they made contributions, 12 states saw the majority of reform group donations go to Republicans, while reformers gave nothing

to Republicans or provided amounts in the single digits in only 6 states. Perhaps most interestingly, the states where reformers gave most of their funds to Republicans also tended to be states where teachers' unions overwhelmingly supported Democrats. This is the case in 10 of those 12 states.

These data make clear, first, that the old story of teachers' unions supporting Democrats is true, although there are exceptions. Second, they show that reform group involvement in elections rose significantly during this time period. Third, they suggest that some states have experienced divergences in education interest group partisan alignment, with reform groups allying with Republicans while teachers' unions stuck by Democrats. We now turn to the explanations for these divergences.

Contribution Networks and Organization Centrality

The networks and contribution data show that the involvement and partisan alignment of interest groups in education has changed a great deal since 2000. Yet underlying these trends are varied policy and partisan contexts that may be shaping trends in party coalitions.

In order to assess the factors that may shape the structural position of interest groups within these extended party networks, we carry out an analysis of the centrality of the largest contributing organizations for each state network. We calculate the normalized out-degree centrality of the highest giving reform group and teachers' union and separately look at the correlates of each centrality measure. The normalized out-degree centrality captures how many candidates a particular interest group supported, as a percentage of the total possible candidates and party committees in the network that they could have donated to. The centrality measure offers a metric for over time changes and state-level variations in group prominence we observe in Figures 1, 2, and 3. For example, in 2000, Washington and Tennessee are more dominated by a single state-level union, while multiple unions are involved in the Michigan contribution network. By 2016, union centrality in all three states

is increasingly challenged by highly active reform organizations. This approach permits us to see what factors are related to changes in the relative involvement and influence of teachers' unions or reformers within party networks over time. We look at two year intervals to account for off-cycle elections. Results are similar if we instead use four or one year intervals.

Figure 4 plots predicted centrality[11] as years increase for both the teachers' union and reform group models. These models, which we display in more detail below, include variables for the key policies of interest: right to work and private school choice. The figure provides strong evidence for the trends suggested by Table 1 as well as the network figures above. The most central teachers' unions lose their importance over time, while reformers gain centrality. In other words, the percentage of state candidates and committees that teachers' unions support decreases while increasing for reform groups. Each year the normalized centrality of teachers' unions falls .29 percentage points ($p < .05$). Meanwhile, reform groups' normalized centrality increases .21 percentage points per year ($p < .05$).

As to our main independent variables of interest, we find that the existence of right to work for teachers is associated with higher centrality for teachers' unions, while private school choice is associated with lower centrality. Figure 5 displays these results.[12] The most central teachers' union in states with private school choice policies are 3.6 percentage points less central ($p < .05$), whereas where their state prohibits the collection of agency fees, they are 4.1 percentages points *more* central ($p < .05$). For reform groups, neither private school choice nor right to work is associated with centrality.[13]

[11]The predicted values are taken with private school choice, school choice groups, right to work, Republican control, and term limits held at zero.

[12]The full results and controls is displayed in the appendix. See Table A2.

[13]We provide results that also include the incomplete independent expenditures data in the appendix.

Figure 4: Predicted Normalized Centrality for the Most Central Education Interest Group Over Time



Predicted values with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 5: The Relationship between Choice and Right to Work Laws and the Most Central Education Interest Group's Normalized Centrality



Coefficients displayed with 95% confidence intervals.

The results thus far support that policy feedbacks may kick into gear in response to right to work for teachers and private school choice. Teachers' unions' responses to these policy environments may help explain divergence in extended partisan networks across states.

Partisan Alignment Across States

In the second step of the analysis, we make sense of differing network trajectories by digging into interest group contributions at the state and election level. Specifically, we examine whether policy feedback may explain divergences in partisan alignments. We look at both the state and election levels. For the former, to calculate whether the two types of interest groups are in coalitions with different parties, we use the following formula:

> Coalition Polarization = |% of reform group donations to Republicans - % of teachers' union donations to Republicans|

In other words, our coalition polarization variable is a measure of the degree of overlap in the share of each side's funding that goes to Republicans. No overlap (polarization = 1) means complete polarization with the two sides in completely different party networks and vice versa (polarization = 0). We examine coalition polarization in terms of the number of candidates and committees funded, rather than number of dollars provided.[14] To account for off-year elections, we calculate polarization using two years of campaign contributions (polarization in year t includes data from year t-1 as well).

For the election-level analysis, where each observation is a single race for a state office, we create a binary variable for whether teachers' unions and education reform groups support candidates of opposite parties, with teachers' unions only supporting one or more Democrats

[14]We use the number of candidates rather than amount donated because campaign contribution limits vary dramatically across states. The consideration of whether to support a given candidate, rather than how much to give, is likely more reflective of an interest group's partisan allegiances, considering that external restrictions largely shape the latter.

and education reform groups only supporting one or more Republicans. We look at these data two ways: we examine races with any education funding, meaning that the dependent variable takes on the value of zero when reformers and unions support the same candidate or both support one of the parties, and we also carry out the analysis with all state races, where the baseline includes races with no education group involvement.[15] Because electoral contests are nested within states, we use multi-level mixed-effects logistic models, including random intercepts for states and for offices nested within states (e.g., North Carolina Senate District 24 or Iowa Agriculture Secretary). This allows us to account for time-invariant characteristics of states and, within states, electoral districts, that might be related to education interest groups' inclination to support candidates. As in the centrality analysis, we test our policy feedback theory by including a measure for the presence of private school choice and with an indicator for the presence of a law prohibiting agency fees for teachers. We include the same controls as in the centrality analysis.

[15]We drop nonpartisan races. We include primaries since open primaries could lead to interest group support for opposite partisans. Dropping primaries does not change the results.

Figure 6: The Relationship Between Choice and Right to Work Laws and Partisan Polarization Among Education Groups



Coefficients displayed with 95% confidence intervals. In the election-level models, non-partisan races are removed. Election-level models are multilevel mixed-effects logistic models, including random intercepts for states and for offices nested within states.

Figure 6 displays the results.[16] It shows that in terms of coalition polarization (the degree of divergence in the parties supported), polarization is greater in states with private school choice policies and right to work for teachers. Moving from a state without private school choice to one with such a policy, while holding school choice advocacy group, Republican legislature, term limits and right to work at zero, the state-level coalition polarization measure goes from almost no polarization at .03 to a moderate level at .18, an increase of 14.1 percentage points ($p < .05$). The magnitude of the relationship is stronger for right to work law, where going from a state without such a law to one with it (holding private school choice, Republican legislature, and school choice advocacy group at zero) is associated with an increase in the polarization measure of 26 percentage points ($p < .05$).

[16]The full results and controls is displayed in the appendix. See Table A4.

As to the election-level analysis, only private school choice is statistically significant. Looking only at elections with education groups involved, the probability of reform groups and teachers' unions supporting opposite partisans increases from .7% to 3% when moving from a state without private school choice to one with it.

These results hold if we drop states without private school choice (for the private school choice variable) and if we drop states without right to work (for the right to work variable) at the start of the time period, in order to create a stronger comparison group for each explanatory variable, respectively (see appendix Tables A5 and A6). Moreover, the results persist when we include independent expenditures (see appendix Table A7).

It may seem counterintuitive that both private school choice and right to work increase polarization, while the former decreases teachers' unions contributions and the latter increases it in the centrality analysis. Nevertheless, this is consistent with our hypotheses. While right to work laws lead teachers' unions to rally to support Democrats, private school choice programs hamper union power by decreasing the number of public school teachers. Moreover, if private school choice laws spur new choice-supporting stakeholders to get involved in politics and support Republicans, this would be consistent with polarization, even if teachers' unions decrease their contributions overall, assuming their donations still go to Democrats. Determining how these policies shape education interest groups' inclination to support candidates from one party or another is the task we turn to next.

Candidate Contributions

We have provided evidence that laws banning agency fees for teachers and private school choice laws are related to high coalition polarization among education interest groups. In this section, we tease out what is happening in more detail by looking at the candidate level. Specifically, we examine the predictors of receiving a campaign contribution from either a reform group or a teachers' union. As in the race-level analysis, we use multilevel mixed-effects

logistic models. This time, however, we interact our independent variables of interest–right to work for teachers and private school choice–with whether the candidate is a Democrat. If right to work laws are contributing to coalition polarization, they should increase the probability that a teachers' unions donate to Democrats rather than Republicans. The inverse should be true for reform groups, which should turn away from Democrats in such policy contexts. A similar pattern should occur in states with private school choice. We carry out specifications with each interaction separately. We also include year fixed effects.

Figure 7 displays the results of the candidate-level analysis.[17] Because we use two different dependent variables - receipt of a contribution from a reform group and receipt of a contribution from a teachers' union - and we include each interaction separately, Figure 7 displays four separate models, with each line from a distinct specification.[18] The panels show the marginal effect of a state having each policy on the probability of a candidate receiving a contribution from either a teachers' union or a reform group.[19] We show this effect both when the candidate is a Republican and when the candidate is a Democrat.

The left panel ("Right to Work") displays the result when moving from a state that allows agency fees for teachers to one that bans them. The figure indicates that when a candidate is not a Democrat, the passage of a right to work bill for teachers correlates with the probability of a donation from a teachers' union. This is consistent with the centrality finding; teachers' unions are supporting more candidates overall in contexts where right to work laws pass. However, the marginal effect is larger for Democratic candidates, meaning that the probability of a teachers' union contribution is highest where right to work laws pass and the candidate is a Democrat. This suggests that right to work laws may increase coalition polarization by driving education interest groups to support opposite partisans.

[17]We drop candidates that are non-partisan or affiliated with third-parties. We look only at candidates in general elections, although results are very similar and statistically significant if we include primaries.

[18]See Table A8 in the appendix for the full results.

[19]Marginal effects are taken holding incumbency, Republican control of the legislature, term limits, private school choice and right to work (respectively) at 0.

Figure 7: Marginal Effect of Indicated Policy on the Probability of a Candidate Receiving a Contribution From Education Interest Groups



Marginal effects displayed with 95% confidence intervals. Figure plots marginal effects from multilevel mixed-effects logistic models, including random intercepts for states and for offices nested within states.

The reform organization side of the equation supports this story. A contribution from reformers is less likely with the passage of a right to work law, regardless of the candidate's partisanship, and the magnitude of this relationship increases when candidates are Democrats. This suggests that such laws have a polarizing effect on education interest group contributions, encouraging teachers unions to support Democrats while sending reformers toward Republicans for the limited contributions they do give.

For private school choice, the relationship between the adoption of the policy and differential support for candidates based on political party is evident for reform groups. The passage of private school choice decreases the probability that reform groups contribute to Democratic candidates. Meanwhile, private school choice also decreases the likelihood of teachers' unions contributions overall, regardless of candidate partisanship; the interaction is not statistically significant. The results are similar if we drop states without right to work

at the start of the time period for the right to work interaction as well as states without private school choice at the start of the time period for the choice interaction. This suggests that the effect is not being driven by long-term unobservable differences in states that already had these policies beforehand (See appendix Table A9). Moreover, the results hold if we include independent expenditures (See appendix Table A10).

Altogether, the results in this section are consistent with our hypothesis that policy feedback can shape coalition polarization. If right to work laws are associated with teachers' unions giving more to Democrats and education reform groups giving less, this should lead to coalition polarization in right to work states as teachers' unions double-down on their support for Democrats. This is consistent with the state-level polarization finding displayed in Figure 6. With private school choice, we find that reform organizations are less likely to give to Democrats when these policies are in place. We do not find a significant interaction between private school choice and union contributions to Democrats, but we do find that unions give to fewer candidates in states with private school choice policies, which is consistent with our centrality results. These findings are consistent with the finding displayed in Figure 6, where private school choice is associated with both fewer overlapping contributions to Republicans and a higher probability that education interest groups support candidates of opposite parties in single elections. Thus, both right to work and private school choice policies are associated with donation patterns at the candidate level that indicate increasing partisan polarization between teachers unions and reform groups.

Conclusion

Our findings show that the extended party networks of state-level political parties can vary widely from one state to the next. Although the role of teachers unions in funding state campaigns remains large in most states, unions no longer monopolize state-level campaign funding from education groups as they did in 2000. While education reform organizations in

some state are central and significant supporters of Republicans and teachers unions align heavily with Democrats, other states feature far more muddled and bipartisan alignments of unions, reform organizations, or both. Furthermore, we show that these variations are strongly associated with state-level policies. Policy feedback–which impacts the resources and mobilization of constituencies and organizations in politics–can reshape the alignment and involvement of interest groups within party networks. In this case, we find that policy feedback from both agency fee bans and private school vouchers is associated with greater coalition polarization of education interest groups.

These findings suggest important political implications from recent enactments of labor retrenchment policies such as right to work. Although these labor policies are usually not specifically education-focused, the goal of weakening teachers unions alongside other public sector unions is a key motivation. The rise of these policies may contribute to the disruption of the relatively bipartisan politics that has characterized education policy in the last two decades. As Grumbach (2018) shows, there is variation in the extent of state-level party polarization in different policy areas, and education policy (such as charter schools and accountability) has had far less partisan polarization than other issue areas. However, Grumbach finds that labor policy is highly polarized, with considerable divergence in policy adoption between Republican controlled and Democratic controlled states. Our research shows that there are consequences for education politics from this labor-related policy polarization. The adoption of labor retrenchment policies contributes to increasing polarization of the partisan networks of education interest groups, potentially creating a spillover of labor policy polarization into education. Over time, this could even be a contributing factor in reducing bipartisan state policy adoption in education policy.

Furthermore, in 2018 the Supreme Court ruled in *Janus v. AFSCME* that union fees in the public sector violate the right to free speech. As a result, public employee unions in 22 states that still allowed agency fees would lose this source of revenue from non-members (DiSalvo 2019). Thus, *Janus* makes "right to work" applicable to all public sector workers,

including public school teachers who are represented by unions. Public sector unions are anticipating losses in membership and revenues. It is too early to empirically assess the consequences of this change for teachers unions in state politics, but we can consider some potential implications based on recent research. Finger & Hartney (2019) show that teachers unions (like the NEA) are federated organizations, and the national NEA has traditionally subsidized campaign spending in states with labor retrenchment policies, since union affiliates in those states had fewer resources available for campaign spending. In other words, the NEA would redistribute funds from strong labor states to weak labor states through campaign contributions and transfers. Based on this finding, Finger and Hartney argue that, "*Janus* will make it much more difficult to support those affiliates that have always struggled, even if they do not experience a policy change as a result of *Janus*, thus leading to weaker organizations as a whole" (13). If teachers unions become weaker overall, this may further accelerate some of the changes in interest group alignments we have shown in this paper to even more states. State-level education reform organizations could have more opportunity to be influential in state politics, and unions may grow even more closely tied to Democrats as they focus on playing defense. This could produce further partisan polarization of unions and reform groups as well as growing centrality of reform organizations in state party networks.

The relationship between policy feedback and extended party networks of education interest groups also suggests opportunities for further research on extended party networks in other policy issue areas. Reuning (Forthcoming) has shown that partisan polarization and interest group positions are important aspects of extended party networks based on campaign contributions, and these networks vary by state and over time. Key state-level issue areas such as environmental policy, criminal justice, and social welfare could also offer ways to explore the relationship between state policy changes and the partisan alignment of interest groups.

Overall, our research highlights the importance of digging deeper into the variations that emerge across the political contexts of the 50 states. The story we uncover reveals

increasing heterogeneity over time in the extended party networks of states among education interest groups. Historically, the political parties varied a great deal at the state level, but national politics in recent decades has largely overshadowed those variations. Nonetheless, our findings show that party coalitions in a specific issue areas can diverge in response to distinct policy trajectories. As a consequence, the landscape of state-level education politics comes in many flavors, with the possibility of more combinations on the horizon if states continue to adopt and develop new policies impacting the resources and mobilization of state education constituencies.

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Appendix

Table A1: Change in the Origin of Education Interest Group Contributions and Their Partisan Destinations, Including Independent Expenditures

	2006-2009				2014-2017			
	% Ed Group $ from TU	TU % of Amt to Dems	% Ed Group $ from Ref. Groups	Reform Groups % of Amt to Repubs	% Ed Group $ from TU	TU % of Amt to Dems	% Ed Group $ From Ref. Groups	Reform Groups % of Amt to Repubs
Alabama	100	95	0	0	95	60	5	96
Alaska	100	84	0	0	100	73	0	0
Arizona	100	95	0	0	29	66	71	72
Arkansas	100	90	0	0	73	97	27	99
California	68	97	32	0	45	99	55	1
Colorado	97	97	3	0	61	99	39	34
Connecticut	100	94	0	0	100	68	0	0
Delaware	96	45	4	0	100	90	0	0
Florida	51	99	49	0	93	94	7	95
Georgia	97	74	3	1	49	25	51	89
Hawaii	100	85	0	0	97	95	3	15
Idaho	100	78	0	0	100	96	0	0
Illinois	100	73	0	0	68	73	32	27
Indiana	100	94	0	0	87	94	13	47
Iowa	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	0
Kansas	100	85	0	0	100	80	0	0
Kentucky	100	76	0	0	100	95	0	0
Louisiana	100	80	0	0	55	87	45	12
Maine	100	100	0	0	99	98	1	100
Maryland	100	97	0	0	99	99	1	0
Massachusetts	100	100	0	0	91	24	9	0
Michigan	85	56	15	1	62	95	38	92
Minnesota	100	100	0	0	100	97	0	0
Mississippi	100	83	0	0	71	33	29	1
Missouri	56	73	44	0	90	96	10	76
Montana	100	97	0	0	100	100	0	0
Nebraska	100	0	0	0	92	15	8	0
Nevada	89	88	11	0	75	90	25	25
New Hampshire	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	100
New Jersey	91	62	9	1	74	85	26	19
New Mexico	99	98	1	0	100	99	0	0
New York	54	83	46	0	54	61	46	43
North Carolina	99	97	1	0	88	85	12	91
North Dakota	100	57	0	0	100	100	0	0
Ohio	95	74	5	1	86	70	14	32
Oklahoma	100	86	0	0	61	66	39	76
Oregon	63	94	37	0	73	98	27	6
Pennsylvania	100	79	0	0	98	89	2	25
Rhode Island	100	97	0	0	100	97	0	0
South Carolina	100	96	0	0	73	92	27	35
South Dakota	100	85	0	0	100	90	0	0
Tennessee	100	82	0	0	35	40	65	78
Texas	92	70	8	1	92	71	8	55
Utah	100	79	0	0	95	78	5	8
Vermont	100	69	0	0	100	86	0	0
Virginia	100	89	0	0	97	93	3	100
Washington	53	99	47	0	63	88	37	31
West Virginia	100	96	0	0	100	96	0	0
Wisconsin	100	81	0	0	70	84	30	98
Wyoming	92	68	8	1	100	58	0	0

Table A2: The Correlates of the Normalized Outdegree Centrality of the Most Central Education Interest Groups

	Most Central Teachers' Union (1)	Most Central Reform Group (2)
Private School Choice	-3.575*	0.451
	(1.672)	(1.268)
Right to Work Law	4.110*	1.347
	(1.924)	(1.317)
Political Ideology (Conservative)	-0.848	-0.0107
	(5.347)	(2.222)
Republican Legislature	0.691	0.942
	(1.744)	(0.729)
School Choice Advocacy Group	-2.711	0.425
	(1.706)	(1.836)
Teachers' Union Membership Rate	0.603	-0.851
	(2.372)	(1.281)
Term Limits	-1.996	0.164
	(2.003)	(1.260)
Year	-0.285*	0.214*
	(0.128)	(0.0846)
N	832	832
R^2	0.663	0.478

* $p < 0.05$

Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. All controls lagged one year. All models include state fixed effects. Table corresponds to results displayed in Figures 4 and 5.

Table A3: The Correlates of the Normalized Outdegree Centrality of the Most Central Education Interest Groups, With Independent Expenditures (Data only from 2006 on)

	Most Central Teachers' Union	Most Central Reform Group
	(1)	(2)
Private School Choice	-2.812	0.0486
	(1.791)	(1.476)
Right to Work Law	2.489	2.899
	(1.795)	(1.679)
Political Ideology (Conservative)	3.477	1.554
	(4.805)	(3.845)
Republican Legislature	-1.232	0.685
	(1.185)	(0.767)
School Choice Advocacy Group	-1.028	-1.004
	(1.409)	(2.509)
Teachers' Union Membership Rate	-1.340	-2.904*
	(2.021)	(1.072)
Term Limits	-5.020*	4.014*
	(2.215)	(1.074)
Year	-0.602*	0.279*
	(0.143)	(0.115)
N	588	588
R^2	0.743	0.589

* $p < 0.05$

Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. All controls lagged one year. All models include state fixed effects. Table corresponds to results displayed in Figures 4 and 5.

Table A4: The Correlates of State and Race-level Partisan Polarization among Education Interest Groups

	State-Level Polarization	Election-Level Polarization	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Private School Choice	0.141*	1.234*	1.162*
	(0.0535)	(0.303)	(0.300)
Right to Work Law	0.263*	-0.185	-0.0391
	(0.110)	(0.246)	(0.241)
Political Ideology (Conservative)	0.130	0.213	-0.0344
	(0.0921)	(0.726)	(0.711)
Republican Legislature	0.0342	-0.133	-0.207
	(0.0283)	(0.217)	(0.214)
School Choice Advocacy Group	0.0771*	0.814*	0.866*
	(0.0308)	(0.201)	(0.199)
Teachers' Union Membership Rate	-0.111	-0.650	-0.713
	(0.0678)	(0.406)	(0.412)
Term Limits	0.0689	0.100	-0.0746
	(0.0414)	(0.431)	(0.439)
Year	0.00106	0.129*	0.122*
	(0.00211)	(0.0147)	(0.0142)
N	882	31212	54839

* $p < 0.05$

Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. All controls lagged one year. State-level model includes state fixed effects. Race-level models are multilevel mixed-effects logistic models, including random intercepts for states and for offices nested within states. Model 2 includes only races with any education involvement. Table corresponds to results displayed in Figure 6.

Table A5: The Correlates of State and Race-level Partisan Polarization among Education Interest Groups, Only States Without Right to Work Laws at the Start of the Time Period (2000)

	State-Level Polarization	Election-Level Polarization	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Private School Choice	0.173*	3.216*	3.372*
	(0.0803)	(0.792)	(0.810)
Right to Work Law	0.312*	-0.303	-0.226
	(0.103)	(0.292)	(0.272)
Political Ideology (Conservative)	0.155	1.070	0.747
	(0.139)	(0.818)	(0.795)
Republican Legislature	0.0132	-0.304	-0.257
	(0.0363)	(0.250)	(0.242)
School Choice Advocacy Group	0.0424	0.613*	0.593*
	(0.0418)	(0.264)	(0.261)
Teachers' Union Membership Rate	-0.0480	0.113	0.176
	(0.0570)	(0.578)	(0.597)
Term Limits	0.00996	1.143	0.924
	(0.0352)	(0.641)	(0.635)
Year	-0.00131	0.131*	0.116*
	(0.00260)	(0.0181)	(0.0172)
N	504	22048	43131

* $p < 0.05$

Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. All controls lagged one year. State-level model includes state fixed effects. Race-level models are multilevel mixed-effects logistic models, including random intercepts for states and for offices nested within states.

Table A6: The Correlates of State and Race-level Partisan Polarization among Education Interest Groups, Only States Without Private School Choice at the Start of the Time Period (2000)

	State-Level Polarization	Election-Level Polarization	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Private School Choice	0.133*	1.320*	1.262*
	(0.0541)	(0.302)	(0.294)
Right to Work Law	0.252*	-0.118	-0.0501
	(0.110)	(0.243)	(0.229)
Political Ideology (Conservative)	0.117	0.259	-0.0574
	(0.104)	(0.727)	(0.699)
Republican Legislature	0.0393	-0.165	-0.143
	(0.0325)	(0.217)	(0.209)
School Choice Advocacy Group	0.0751*	0.829*	0.828*
	(0.0324)	(0.201)	(0.197)
Teachers' Union Membership Rate	-0.125	-0.513	-0.600
	(0.0749)	(0.410)	(0.412)
Term Limits	0.0775	0.170	-0.00949
	(0.0420)	(0.429)	(0.425)
Year	0.00177	0.126*	0.110*
	(0.00226)	(0.0146)	(0.0139)
N	828	31463	67227

* $p < 0.05$

Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. All controls lagged one year. State-level model includes state fixed effects. Race-level models are multilevel mixed-effects logistic models, including random intercepts for states and for offices nested within states.

Table A7: The Correlates of State and Race-level Partisan Polarization among Education Interest Groups, Including Independent Expenditures (Data only from 2006 on)

	State-Level Polarization	Election-Level Polarization	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Private School Choice	0.134	1.143*	1.010*
	(0.0686)	(0.301)	(0.285)
Right to Work Law	0.366*	0.534	0.462
	(0.132)	(0.286)	(0.268)
Political Ideology (Conservative)	-0.0783	0.665	0.724
	(0.185)	(0.924)	(0.875)
Republican Legislature	0.0234	-1.098*	-1.106*
	(0.0398)	(0.272)	(0.258)
School Choice Advocacy Group	0.0742*	1.089*	1.064*
	(0.0294)	(0.224)	(0.217)
Teachers' Union Membership Rate	-0.0867	-0.185	-0.333
	(0.119)	(0.457)	(0.444)
Term Limits	0.185*	2.080*	1.998*
	(0.0786)	(0.600)	(0.620)
Year	0.00439	0.201*	0.182*
	(0.00403)	(0.0229)	(0.0216)
N	588	22705	55166

* $p < 0.05$

Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. All controls lagged one year. State-level model includes state fixed effects. Race-level models are multilevel mixed-effects logistic models, including random intercepts for states and for offices nested within states.

Table A8: The Correlates of Receiving a Campaign Contribution from Education Interest Groups

	Teachers' Union Contribution		Reform Group Contribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	2.597*	2.640*	-0.0147	-0.377*
	(0.0273)	(0.0249)	(0.0597)	(0.0577)
Private School Choice	-0.106*	-0.132*	0.880*	1.062*
	(0.0423)	(0.0504)	(0.150)	(0.153)
Choice x Democrat		0.0391		-0.520*
		(0.0427)		(0.103)
Right to Work	0.562*	0.642*	-0.233	-0.868*
	(0.0869)	(0.0832)	(0.158)	(0.149)
Right to Work x Democrat	0.129*		-1.574*	
	(0.0399)		(0.111)	
Political Ideology (Conservative)	0.151	0.151	-0.971*	-0.949*
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.350)	(0.349)
Republican Legislature	0.140*	0.138*	0.303*	0.321*
	(0.0354)	(0.0354)	(0.117)	(0.117)
School Choice Advocacy Group	-0.149*	-0.150*	-0.211*	-0.210*
	(0.0333)	(0.0333)	(0.0803)	(0.0799)
Teachers' Union Membership Rate	0.129*	0.126*	-0.928*	-0.932*
	(0.0524)	(0.0525)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Term Limits	-0.297*	-0.295*	0.221	0.191
	(0.0564)	(0.0564)	(0.305)	(0.306)
Incumbent	1.680*	1.675*	1.153*	1.202*
	(0.0205)	(0.0204)	(0.0504)	(0.0499)
N	98092	98092	95329	95329

* $p < 0.05$

Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. All controls lagged one year. All models are multilevel mixed-effects logistic models, including random intercepts for states and for offices nested within states. Fixed effects for years are also included. Models correspond to the marginal effects displayed in Figure 7.

Table A9: The Correlates of Receiving a Campaign Contribution, Only States without Right to Work or Private School Choice at Analysis Start of Time Period (2000)

	States without RTW in 2000		States without Choice in 2000	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
DV = Contribution from	TU	Ref	TU	Ref
Democrat	2.679*	-0.0370	2.657*	-0.377*
	(0.0289)	(0.0599)	(0.0253)	(0.0578)
Private School Choice	0.0636	3.118*	-0.0368	1.369*
	(0.0592)	(0.522)	(0.0545)	(0.156)
Choice x Democrat			-0.0998	-0.690*
			(0.0523)	(0.126)
Right to Work	0.445*	0.409*	0.668*	-0.520*
	(0.103)	(0.197)	(0.0837)	(0.153)
Right to Work x Democrat	0.117	-2.776*		
	(0.0796)	(0.314)		
Political Ideology (Conservative)	0.122	-1.574*	0.394*	-1.329*
	(0.162)	(0.396)	(0.134)	(0.374)
Republican Legislature	0.194*	-0.0608	-0.0170	0.116
	(0.0456)	(0.147)	(0.0402)	(0.120)
School Choice Advocacy Group	-0.278*	-0.577*	-0.125*	0.461*
	(0.0436)	(0.101)	(0.0368)	(0.0897)
Teachers' Union Membership Rate	0.0438	-0.593*	0.117*	-0.991*
	(0.0585)	(0.116)	(0.0537)	(0.111)
Term Limits	-0.469*	0.624	-0.215*	0.980*
	(0.0740)	(0.446)	(0.0606)	(0.320)
Incumbent	1.907*	1.306*	1.710*	1.193*
	(0.0264)	(0.0608)	(0.0219)	(0.0533)
N	65139	62938	87365	84602

* $p < 0.05$

TU = Teachers' Unions, Ref = Reform Groups. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. All controls lagged one year. All models are multilevel mixed-effects logistic models, including random intercepts for states and for offices nested within states. Fixed effects for years are also included.

Table A10: The Correlates of Receiving a Campaign Contribution or Benefiting from Independent Spending from Education Interest Groups, Data from 2006 on

	Teachers' Union Contribution		Reform Group Contribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	2.757*	2.862*	0.168*	-0.211*
	(0.0360)	(0.0338)	(0.0653)	(0.0620)
Private School Choice	-0.0371	-0.0214	0.523*	0.773*
	(0.0534)	(0.0629)	(0.150)	(0.153)
Choice x Democrat		-0.0292		-0.735*
		(0.0497)		(0.105)
Right to Work	-0.0176	0.136	0.327	-0.328*
	(0.101)	(0.0942)	(0.170)	(0.163)
Right to Work x Democrat	0.211*		-1.683*	
	(0.0486)		(0.113)	
Political Ideology (Conservative)	0.465*	0.466*	0.480	0.546
	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.390)	(0.389)
Republican Legislature	-0.0757	-0.0779	-0.447*	-0.414*
	(0.0453)	(0.0454)	(0.131)	(0.131)
School Choice Advocacy Group	0.143*	0.143*	-0.379*	-0.371*
	(0.0418)	(0.0418)	(0.0864)	(0.0859)
Teachers' Union Membership Rate	0.144	0.145	-1.663*	-1.667*
	(0.0773)	(0.0776)	(0.129)	(0.129)
Term Limits	-0.469*	-0.467*	2.594*	2.534*
	(0.136)	(0.135)	(0.710)	(0.706)
Incumbent	2.384*	2.377*	1.676*	1.707*
	(0.0257)	(0.0257)	(0.0516)	(0.0512)
N	83644	83644	81924	81924

* $p < 0.05$

Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. All controls lagged one year. All models are multilevel mixed-effects logistic models, including random intercepts for states and for offices nested within states. Fixed effects for years are also included.